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SYMPOSIUM:
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING AT
A CROSSROADS: CONSUMER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
Competition, Environment, and the Electric
Industry: A Special Symposium on
Restructuring at the Crossroads
FRED ZALCMAN* AND DAVID NICHOLS**
The U.S. electric industry is in the midst of wrenching
changes. For well over fifty years, most consumers have relied
upon their local investor-owned utility (IOU) for the generation,
delivery and sale of electric power. In exchange for a state-con-
ferred franchise and a fair return on invested capital, IOUs have
historically submitted to thorough regulation intended to promote
the public interest in reliable, affordable, and environmentally
sound service. This system arose as a result of economic realities
favoring natural monopoly conditions and conscious regulatory
policy to both safeguard the IOU from "ruinous competition"' and
to protect consumers from the adverse effects of monopoly control
- higher prices, restricted output, and the transfer of wealth from
consumers to the utility.2 Publicly owned power systems, serving
a significant minority of electricity consumers, have also followed
the path of affordable prices based on production costs.
The last several years have seen a major impetus to deregu-
late as much of the industry as feasible, beginning with electric
generation, through a process that has come to be known as elec-
tricity "restructuring." The movement for electricity restructuring
* Senior Attorney, Pace Law School Energy Project, White Plains, New York.
** Director of Energy Efficiency Program, Tellus Institute, Boston,
Massachusetts.
1. Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 141 P. 1083 (Idaho 1914).
2. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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has drawn its strength from three major sources. First, signifi-
cant rate disparities arose as a result of investment by some utili-
ties in nuclear and other capital-intensive generation capacity.
Industrial customers - or, more particularly, trade associations
representing large industrial energy users - pressed for regula-
tory reforms that would allow greater access to lower priced elec-
tricity. Second, advances in generation technology, falling natural
gas prices, and federal policy changes have given rise to the devel-
opment of an independent power industry capable of producing
electricity more efficiently and economically than many older-vin-
tage utility plants. Third, the country's prevailing economic and
political climate has favored deregulation wherever possible. In
this context, the push to deregulate electricity was bolstered by
the earlier experience in natural gas and airline deregulation.
In recent years, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which has jurisdiction over interstate generation and
transmission, has been a driving force behind electricity restruc-
turing. FERC has instituted several measures to create competi-
tive bulk power markets, such as requiring that owners of
transmission lines wheel power for any supplier, whether or not
an affiliated company.3 FERC has fostered the formation of whole-
sale electric energy markets managed by state or regional inde-
pendent system operators (ISOs). 4 This has permitted market-
based pricing of interstate power sales, where formerly such sales
were all priced based on production costs. But the main thrust to
deregulate generation pricing has come from the states, which his-
torically have had the authority to regulate their intrastate elec-
tricity industries. By late 2000, twenty-four states, including most
of the larger states, had decided to deregulate electricity
generation.5
But recent developments in the states furthest along with re-
structuring have given pause. Unregulated generation prices are
higher than hoped, in some cases dramatically higher, and rela-
3. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and RM94-7-
001, Order No. 888, PROMOTING WHOLESALE COMPETITION THROUGH OPEN ACCESS
NON-DISCRIMINATORY TRANSMISSION SERVICES BY PUBLIC UTILS.: RECOVERY OF
STRANDED COSTS BY PUB. UTILS. AND TRANSMITTING UTILS. (May 29, 1996), available
at http://www.ferc.fed.us/newsl/rules/pages/environmentaL.pdf.
4. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1999).
5. See Energy Information Administration, The Status of Electricity Industry
Restructuring Activity as of April 2001: Retail Access, Public Benefits, Stranded Cost
Efforts, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg-str/tab5rev.html (last modified
April 5, 2001) (Retail Access, Public Benefits, and Stranded Cost Efforts).
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tively few consumers have actually chosen non-utility power sup-
pliers.6 Likewise, there is growing concern that the potential
environmental benefits of restructuring may never materialize.
The result is a hiatus in the momentum for restructuring. At this
critical juncture, the need is to understand what has happened,
and where to go from here.
In November 2000, the Pace Environmental Law Review, 7 the
Pace Law School Energy Project,8 and the Tellus Institute9 jointly
sponsored "Electric Industry Restructuring at a Crossroads: Con-
sumer and Environmental Implications." The premise of the Sym-
posium was that the electric industry is at a critical juncture.
Policy makers must decide whether today's dysfunctional whole-
sale markets and associated social costs are temporary and aber-
rational and thus stay the regulatory course; or alternatively, that
the problems being experienced reflect that electricity supply has
inherent infrastructural and oligopolistic dimensions.
The shift from regulation to markets raises a host of legal and
policy issues. What are the prerequisites for competitive genera-
tion markets, and how can these prerequisites be secured through
state and federal energy policy? Are there market failures that
harm economic growth, human health, and the environment, and
warrant continued regulatory intervention? Can environmental
policies be designed to support the efficient operation of markets,
technological innovation, and expanded choice? If so, are these
policies most effectively implemented at the state or federal
levels?
Making Markets Work: Electricity deregulation has had the
same goals as deregulation of other industries, such as the air-
lines and long-distance telecommunications: to allow competitive
6. California regulators have proposed a surcharge of three cents per kilowatt-
hour to be added to rates charged by the economically troubled Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric Company, and Southern California Edison Company. This surcharge will trans-
late into rate increases of over forty percent. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, INTERIM
OPINION REGARDING PROPOSED RATE INCREASES, Application 00-11-038 (Mar. 26,
2001), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/AGENDADECISION/5953.
htm. The state has also directly intervened in California electricity markets by enter-
ing into long-term contracts with generating companies on behalf of the state's inves-
tor owned utilities, as has the Department of Energy by directing generators to sell to
the cash-strapped utilities.
7. See generally Pace University School of Law, Pace Environmental Law Re-
view, at http://www.pace.edu/lawschool/pacelaw/pelr.
8. See generally Pace University School of Law, Pace Law School Energy Project,
at http://www.pace.edu/lawschool/env/energy.
9. See generally Tellus Institute, at http://www.tellus.org.
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markets to create economic efficiency. The widespread expectation
has been that competition in the electric industry will create con-
sumer choices and result in lower prices than under cost-of-service
regulation. Unexpected price increases in California, New York,
and elsewhere are creating huge uncertainty about the impact of
electric industry restructuring on consumer interests. State regu-
lators are wondering whether they may have ceded to the federal
government and newly-minted ISOs much of their ability to pro-
tect people and businesses from the harsher aspects of
competition.10
Others still see the early experiments in restructuring as too
timid, insofar as vestiges of consumer/environmental protection-
ism have compromised the full benefits of unfettered competition.
According to this viewpoint, several dozen new generating facili-
ties in the pipeline are a panacea,'1 bringing supply and demand
back in balance, and imposing needed discipline on existing mar-
ket participants.
Accordingly, the central question addressed at the symposium
was: Can markets yet be made to work? What are the possibilities
of competitive electric markets? Are there limits to the relevance
and efficacy of markets in delivery of electric energy services?
Several major sub-issues and themes were explored at the sympo-
sium, including:
Institutional Issues - The Respective Roles of State Commis-
sions, FERC, and the ISO: At the same time the U.S. Supreme
Court is devolving authority back to the states under new
principles of federalism, the states are finding themselves un-
able to cope with the numerous energy issues that transcend
political borders. Trans-boundary air pollution, the formation
of regional (and even international) markets for energy, the
creation of huge power giants through utility mergers and ac-
quisitions, and the evolution towards regionalization of the
transmission system all present problems not easily accommo-
dated by state and federal regulators acting within their own
jurisdictional spheres. The limitations of the current regula-
tory patchwork have been made manifest with recent electric-
ity price spikes. FERC and the regional ISOs all appear
10. See Letter from Michael Kahn & Loretta Lynch, to Gray Davis, Governor, Cal-
ifornia (Aug. 2, 2000) (report on California's electricity options and challenges) availa-
ble at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/published/reportfransmittalLetter.htm.
11. See, e.g., NEW YORK INDEP. SYSTEM OPERATOR, POWER ALERT: NEW YORK'S
ENERGY CROSSROADS 4 (Mar. 2001) (recommending the addition of 8,600 MW of new
capacity in New York State by 2005).
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unable to independently identify and cope with instances of
potential market power abuse. 12 These sessions explored
these developments and the extent to which they may call for
new regulatory structures and policies.
*Recognizing Market Power: What is market power and how
can it be recognized? What are its consequences? What are
the preconditions for competitive generation markets? How do
generation capacity and transmission capacity affect market
power? How competitive are markets to date a) at the whole-
sale level, and b) at the retail level?
Policy Options for Dealing with Wholesale Market Failure:
What are the advantages and disadvantages of a range of re-
sponses to chaotic market conditions? Measures considered in-
clude the imposition of wholesale price caps, alternative
auction schemes, aggressive demand reduction and price re-
sponsive load bidding, and expedited power plant siting and
review.
Environmental Stewardship: Restructuring is driven by eco-
nomic objectives, not environmental concerns. Nonetheless, re-
structuring has direct implications for a range of policy
mechanisms that were developed in the cost-of-service regulatory
environment to reduce the tremendous environmental footprint of
the electric industry. Mechanisms like integrated resource plan-
ning,13 explicit accounting of environmental externalities, 14 utility
investment in energy efficiency measures, 15 and incentive regula-
12. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth & Joseph Kahn, Critics Say U.S. Energy Agency is Weak
in Oversight of Utilities, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al.
13. Integrated resource planning refers to a process of identifying a mix of supply-
side (i.e. new generation) and demand-side (i.e. conservation) energy options that
meets anticipated needs at the lowest economic and social cost. See Ralph Cavanagh,
Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and Their Regulators, 10 HAR.
ENVTL. L. REV. 299 (1986).
14. Environmental externalities represent the environmental and other social
costs of electric power production, delivery and consumption that are not reflected in
the price of electricity. See RICHARD O'rINGER ET AL., ENVTL. COSTS OF ELECTRICITY
(1990). A number of states instituted policies in the 1980s and 1990s to explicitly
account for these costs in resource decisions. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14 § 12-
3.8 (1996) (externality value of $.02 per kilowatt-hour for electric utility demand-side
management programs).
15. See STEVEN NADEL ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY,
DSM UNDER ATTACK: ARE UTILITIES OVERREACTING TO THE THREAT OF RETAIL WHEEL-
ING? (1995). In New York, for example, utility expenditures on demand-side manage-
ment programs fell precipitously from peak level spending in 1992 of $286.3 million to
under $95 million by 1996.
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tion 16 have been deemed incompatible with the prevailing indus-
try structure. 17 Some restructuring states have recast some of
these mechanisms as new policies, but others have not. These in-
clude public benefits funds for delivery of energy efficiency pro-
grams, renewable energy development, low income initiatives,
etc.,' 8 or renewable resource generation requirements to be met
by all power suppliers.19 Moreover, competition opens new mar-
kets for older, fully depreciated coal-fired power plants that are
generally subject to less stringent air quality controls. 20 Finally,
there is concern that retail energy suppliers will compete almost
exclusively on the basis of price, and will not typically offer con-
sumers energy efficiency and other "value-added" services.
On the other hand, some see the unleashing of market forces
as furthering environmental goals. The discipline of the market
place will force the shut down of inefficient plants. Consumers
will, for the first time, be empowered to choose electric companies
on the basis of their environmental record, in turn sending signals
to the market to build more high-value clean and renewable en-
ergy facilities. 21
Though driven by indications that the economic premises of
restructuring may be flawed, the pause in the momentum away
from regulation underscores the complexity facing environmental
16. See DAVID NICHOLS, TELLUS INSTITUTE, REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR DE-
MAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT (1999), available at http://www.tellus.org/energy/publica-
tions/9821 lrpt.pdf.
17. See CAL. PUB. UrIL. COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC SERVICES INDUSTRY: PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE PAST, STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 94 (1993). "Years of fine tuning a
sophisticated least-cost procurement process that attempts to predict 'what the utility
would do' further leaves the state with what many view as a lengthy, intrusive, and
complex regulatory approach that no longer seems to mesh with a rapidly changing
market for electric services." Id.
18. See MARTIN KUSHLER & PATTI WITTE, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT
ECONOMY, REVIEW AND EARLY ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC BENEFIT POLICIES UNDER RE-
STRUCTURING (2000).
19. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § c.48:3-49 (West
1999).
20. See BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS,
GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARABILITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
AIR EMISSIONS REGULATIONS AND ELECTRIC MARKET DISTORTIONS (Jan. 28, 1998)
available at http://www.synapse-energy.com/publication.htm; See David Wooley, En-
vironmental Comparability, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES. & ENV'T 276, 279 (1998).
21. See BRUCE BIEWALD, NAT'L AsS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS, PROMOTING
ENVTL. QUALITY IN A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (1995); See Richard F. Hirsh
& Adam H. Serchuk, Power Switch: Will the Restructured Electric Utility System
Help the Environment?, 47 ENV'T 4, 6 (Sept. 1999), available at http:l
www.majbill.vt.edu/history/hirsh/EnviroArticleAsPublished.htm.
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stakeholders who now need to understand three differing sets of
challenges:
* how to assure that environmental objectives are effectively in-
corporated in the structure of deregulated markets;
" how to assure appropriate environmental protection mecha-
nisms in jurisdictions retaining full regulation of electricity;
and
* whether or not, and under what conditions, to support further
restructuring.
The symposium's discussion served to highlight the major en-
vironmental risks introduced by restructuring. Presenters ad-
dressed such issues as the effectiveness of market compatible
policies to protect the environment, whether certain existing envi-
ronmental and utility regulatory policies themselves represent
barriers to the introduction of clean energy technologies, and what
additional actions need to be taken to harmonize environmental
and economic objectives.
* Addressing Environmental Values in Resource Planning and
Acquisition: Should power plant development and issues of
"need" be left to market participants? Do current state siting
processes allow adequate consideration of such issues as fuel
diversity, natural gas and electric transmission capacity, envi-
ronmental justice and cumulative environmental effects?
* Eliminating Environmental Regulatory Barriers: The partici-
pants explored the economic and environmental effects of une-
ven environmental regulation and the legal theories behind
the recent federal and state lawsuits against Midwestern
power plants under the Clean Air Act to force these plants to
meet modern pollution control requirements.
* Barriers to Distributed Generation and Combined Heat and
Power Systems: Owing to superior environmental, reliability,
technical efficiency, and power quality characteristics, many
electric industry participants see small scale, decentralized
power systems as the wave of the future. Despite their prom-
ise, these technologies will be consigned to niche markets
without significant revision to public policies intended prima-
rily to address central station utility power plants. The panel
explored the prospects for distributed technologies, and the
policy issues most critical to the commercial viability of these
technologies.
* The Role of Regulation in Promoting Technological Innova-
tion: Is there a continuing role for publicly supported, competi-
2001]
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tively neutral research and development in a restructured
electric industry? If so, what is the best delivery mechanism?
What is the best administrative regime?
In the months following the symposium, the issues it ad-
dressed moved quickly into the sphere of public discussion and de-
bate, fueled most strikingly by the experience in California:
distribution utilities verging on bankruptcy, power supplies so
short that rolling blackouts were imposed at times of high de-
mand, the state itself entering the market as an interim buyer of
wholesale power, large retail rate increases, and no overall resolu-
tion of the crisis in view. Underlying tensions based on apparent
admixtures of ideology and expertise sharpened, as some attrib-
uted the California crisis solely to deregulation, and others to eve-
rything but deregulation. In the latter vein, blame has been
placed on insufficient generating capacity, too much air quality
regulation, a cumbersome process for building new electricity sup-
plies, or the need for new fossil energy resources. But careful
scholarly analysis of market behavior has shown that the major
factor increasing power costs in California, at least through 2000,
is generator market power, enabled by the new wholesale market
structure.22 This finding is echoed in other analyses. 23
It was always envisioned that there would be a "transitional
period" in the move toward restructuring. It is now evident that
the "transition" is a rather unstable state. The nature of the cross-
roads becomes clear. Much fundamental work must be done to cre-
ate workably competitive electric market structures. Or, much
fundamental work must be done to recreate reasonably regulated
electricity markets.
22. See PAUL JOSKOW & EDWARD KAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGU-
LATORY STUDIES, A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRICING BEHAVIOR IN CALIFORNIA'S
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET DURING SUMMER 2000 (Jan. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working_01-01.pdf.
23. See, e.g., RICHARD Rosen ET AL., TELLUS INST., CAN ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING
MEET THE CHALLENGES IT HAS CREATED? (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.tellus.
org/energy/publications/restructchallenge.pdf.
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